Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets*
Paul Joskow, Department of Economics, and
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, MIT
Jean Tirole, IDEI and GREMAQ (UMR 5604 CNRS), Toulouse,
CERAS (URA 2036 CNRS), Paris, and MIT
Despite all of the talk about “deregulation” of the electricity
sector, a large number of non-market mechanisms have been imposed on emerging
competitive wholesale and retail markets. These mechanisms include spot market
price caps, operating reserve requirements, non-price rationing protocols, and
administrative protocols for managing system emergencies. Many of these mechanisms
have been carried over from the old regime of regulated monopoly and continue
to be justi?ed as necessary responses to market imperfections of various kinds
and engineering requirements dictated by the special physical attributes of
electric power networks. This paper seeks to bridge the gap between economists
focused on designing competitive market mechanisms and engineers focused on
the physical attributes and engineering requirements they perceive as being
needed for operating a reliable electric power system. The paper starts by deriving
the optimal prices and investment program when there are price-insensitive retail
consumers, and their load serving entities can choose any level of rationing
they prefer contingent on real time prices. It then examines the assumptions
required for a competitive wholesale and retail market to achieve this optimal
price and investment program. The paper analyses the implications of relaxing
several of these assumptions. First, it analyzes the interrelationships between
regulator-imposed price caps, capacity obligations, and system operator procurement,
dispatch and compensation arrangements. It goes on to explore the implications
of potential network collapses, the concomitant need for operating reserve requirements
and whether market prices will provide incentives for investments consistent
with these reserve requirements.
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