In PWP-025, the author's main purpose is to challenge several claims about the roles of nodal prices and transmission rights that have been accepted by some practitioners and academicians involved in the discussion on the transition towards a more competitive electricity sector, both in the U.S. and abroad. In particular, Oren, et. al demonstrate the inadequacy of pricing transmission services and compensating transmission owners on the basis of nodal price differences. Although such application of nodal prices may be suitable in simple (i.e., linear or radial) networks, in networks with parallel flow paths basing transmission pricing on nodal price differences is inappropriate. Moreover, without extensive regulation, transmission capacity rights based on a nodal price differences will not produce the right incentives for transmission investment or expansion, nor will they provide appropriate compensation for ownership of transmission assests or rights in a decentralized ownership network. The authors assert that new methods to deal with transmission ownership compensation and expansion are needed if the move towards a competitive wholesale electricity market is not to be bogged down in a regulatory quagmire.