In PWP-039, Johnson, Oren, and Svoboda examine the effect of competition and decentralized ownership on resource scheduling in a pool-based electric power system. They show that centralized scheduling of multi-owned resources under imperfect information may face difficulties that do not arise when resources are centrally owned. The authors perform a simulation case study using a lagrangian relaxation-based unit commitment algorithm modified to simulate proposed uniform-price pool auction procedures. This algorithm is based on the Hydro-Thermal Optimization (HTO) program used in short-term resource scheduling at PG&E. They demonstrate, for a bench mark system, that variations in near-optimal schedules that have negligible effect on total system cost can have significant consequences on the total payments by customers to generators and on the distribution of profits among the generators. Thus, a system operator charged with making efficient central unit commitment decisions is in a delicate position of making distributional decisions among customers and resource owners with no economic rationale to back these decisions. These effects are inherent in unit commitment optimization problems because of the presence of many near-optimal solutions. The authors argue that these results highlight potential pitfalls in central management of dispatch constraints specified by bidders and they support a more decentralized approaches to unit commitment.